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Abstract
This paper focuses on a kind of linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game driven by
backward stochastic differential equation with asymmetric information, which is a natural
continuation of [12, 13]. Different from [12, 13], novel motivations for studying this kind
of game are provided. Some feedback Nash equilibrium points are uniquely obtained by
forward-backward stochastic differential equations, their filters and the corresponding Riccati
equations with Markovian setting.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic differential game plays an important role in lots of fields. Many researchers investi-
gated this problem under various setups [1, 3, 9, 15]. Recently, [12] studied a non-zero sum dif-
ferential game of nonlinear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short). Later,
in [13], they generalized the game in [12] to the partial information case, and obtained an open-
loop Nash equilibrium point for a linear quadratic (LQ, for short) game with same observable
information. In some situations of real markets, say, insider trading, one investor may get more
information than the others, and then, this investor can make a better decision than the others.
It implies that asymmetric information has effect on the decision making. Such a kind of effect
is pervasive in reality, but is usually ignored in literature. To fill in the gap, this paper initi-
ates the study of an LQ non-zero sum differential game of BSDE with asymmetric information.
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This study can be regarded as a first step to investigate such a kind of differential game with
asymmetric information.
This paper is closely related to [2,10], where the state satisfies a (forward) stochastic differen-
tial equation (SDE, for short), and thus the BSDE appears as an adjoint of the state equation.
In this paper, the state is governed by a BSDE rather than an SDE. Since the construction
and property of BSDE are essentially different from those of SDE, the game of BSDE cap-
tures different scenarios. See, e.g., Section 2.1 for more information. This paper is also related
to [4, 5, 7, 8, 16–18], where asymmetric information is not considered. Therefore, this paper is
distinguished from the exiting references about stochastic differential game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a kind of LQ game of BSDE
with asymmetric information is formulated in detail and an open-loop Nash equilibrium point
is derived. Section 3 is devoted to solving three concrete cases of the LQ game. Feedback Nash
equilibrium points are uniquely obtained by the filters of forward-backward SDEs (FBSDEs, for
short). One numerical example is also shown. In Section 4, some concluding remarks are given.
Finally, in Appendix, several examples are shown to illustrate that the special cases we studied
in Section 3 are realistic.
2 Problem formulation and equilibrium points
Let us begin with a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P), in which Ft de-
notes a natural filtration generated by a two dimensional standard Brownian motion w(t) =
(w1(t), w2(t))
∗. Suppose that F = FT , E is the expectation with respect to P, and T > 0
is a fixed time horizon. We denote by the superscript ∗ the transpose of vectors or matri-
ces, by | · | the norm, and by FXt the filtration generated by a stochastic process X, i.e.,
FXt = σ
{
X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
. We call E
(
h(t)|FXt
)
the optimal filter of h(t) with respect to FXt .
We also give the notations h˜(t) = E (h(t)|Fw2t ) and hˆ(t) = E (h(t)|F
w1
t ).
Let G it ⊆ Ft be a given sub-filtration, which represents the information available to the
player i (i = 1, 2) up to the time t. If G it = Ft (resp. G
i
t ⊂ Ft), we call the information available
to the player i complete (resp. partial). If G 1t 6= G
2
t (resp. G
1
t = G
2
t ), we call the information
available to two players asymmetric (resp. symmetric). For simplicity, we usually omit the
terminology “complete information”.
2.1 An economic example
Suppose that a consumer has a reward ξ > 0 at the terminal time T and continuously consumes
between 0 and T . Here ξ is an FT -measurable and square-integrable random variable. Let c1(t)
and c2(t) be the consumption rates about two different consumables F1 (such as certain kind of
meat) and F2 (such as certain kind of vegetable), respectively. Let p1(t) and p2(t) be the prices
of F1 and F2, respectively, which are Ft-adapted processes. Set P
i
t = σ{pi(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and
let
Ci =
{
ci(·)| ci(t) is G
i
t -adapted and square-integrable
}
be the set of all consumption rates ci(t), where G
i
t ⊆ P
i
t (i = 1, 2). It implies that the consumer
chooses ci(t) depending on G
i
t (i = 1, 2). This is reasonable in reality.
2
Let yc1,c2(t) be the Kreps-Porteus recursive utility of the consumer. According to [6], a
special case of yc1,c2(t) is modeled by{
−dyc1,c2(t) =
(
c1(t) + c2(t)− y
c1,c2(t)
)
dt− zc1,c21 (t)dw1(t)− z
c1,c2
2 (t)dw2(t),
yc1,c2(T ) = ξ.
Define the performance functional as
Ji
(
c1(·), c2(·)
)
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
(ci(t)− ei(t))
2
dt− riy
c1,c2(0)
]
,
where ei is a deterministic and uniformly bounded function, and is interpreted as a dynamic
benchmark; ri is a positive constant (i = 1, 2). It is natural that the consumer wants not only
to prevent ci(t) from large deviation, but also to maximize y
c1,c2(0). That is,

J1(c
∗
1(·), c
∗
2(·)) = min
c1(·)∈C1
J1(c1(·), c
∗
2(·)),
J2(c
∗
1(·), c
∗
2(·)) = min
c2(·)∈C2
J2(c
∗
1(·), c2(·)).
Note that yc1,c2(t) satisfies a BSDE and G 1t is not always equal to G
2
t . Then the economic example
can be regarded as a special LQ non-zero sum differential game of BSDE with asymmetric
information.
2.2 Problem formulation
Motivated by the above example, we consider the controlled linear BSDE

−dyv1,v2(t) =
(
a(t)yv1,v2(t) + b1(t)v1(t) + b2(t)v2(t) +
2∑
j=1
fj(t)z
v1,v2
j (t) + c(t)
)
dt
− zv1,v21 (t)dw1(t)− z
v1,v2
2 (t)dw2(t),
yv1,v2(T ) =ξ,
(1)
and the cost functional
Ji
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
li(t)
(
yv1,v2(t)− ki(t)
)2
+mi(t)
(
vi(t)− ni(t)
)2]
dt
+ri
(
yv1,v2(0)− hi
)2}
(i = 1, 2).
(2)
Here a, b1, b2, f1, f2, c, k1, k2, n1 and n2 are uniformly bounded and {Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}-adapted; h1
and h2 are given constants; l1, l2, m1 and m2 are positive, uniformly bounded and {Ft, 0 ≤
t ≤ T}-adapted; r1 and r2 are two nonnegative constants; ξ is an FT -measurable and square-
integrable random variable; v1(·) and v2(·) are the control processes of the player 1 and the
player 2, respectively. We use the notation (yv1,v2 , zv1,v21 , z
v1,v2
2 ) to denote the dependence of the
state on the control (v1, v2). Introduce the admissible control set for the player i (i = 1, 2)
Ui =
{
vi(·)| vi(t) is G
i
t -adapted and square-integrable
}
.
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Each element of Ui is called an open-loop admissible control for the player i (i = 1, 2). U1 ×U2
is the set of open-loop admissible controls for the players. Suppose that each player i hopes
to minimize her/his cost functional Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) by selecting a suitable admissible control
vi(·) (i = 1, 2). Then the problem is to look for (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 ×U2, which is called a Nash
equilibrium point of the game, such that

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v1(·)∈U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v2(·)∈U2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
subject to (1) and (2). We call the game problem an LQ non-zero sum stochastic differential
game of BSDE with asymmetric information. For simplicity, we denote the problem by Prob-
lem (AI), and abbreviate (yu1,u2 , zu1,u21 , z
u1,u2
2 ) by (y, z1, z2). Clearly, Problem (AI) covers the
example in Section 2.1 as a special case.
The main goal of this paper is to derive some Nash equilibrium points in the feedback form
of the filtered states. However, since G it available to the player i (i = 1, 2) is only an abstract
sub-filtration of Ft, it is impossible to obtain feedback Nash equilibrium points in general.
Then some special information structures for G it (i = 1, 2) are desirable to reach the goal. For
example, (i) G 1t = G
2
t = F
w2
t , i.e., two players have access to the same observation information;
(ii) G 1t = Ft and G
2
t = F
w2
t , i.e., one player has more information at any time than the
other player; (iii) G 1t = F
w1
t and G
2
t = F
w2
t , i.e., two players have independent observation
information and do not share all of their information with each other. These special information
structures are inspired by Remarks A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix, respectively.
2.3 Nash equilibrium point
The following proposition is an immediate result of Theorem 2.1 in [13]. It is very helpful for us
to discuss some details and special cases of Problem (AI).
Proposition 2.1 (u1, u2) is a Nash equilibrium point of Problem (AI) if and only if (u1, u2) is
in the form of 

u1(t) =
E
(
b1(t)x1(t)|G
1
t
)
E
(
m1(t)|G
1
t
) + E
(
m1(t)n1(t)|G
1
t
)
E
(
m1(t)|G
1
t
) ,
u2(t) =
E
(
b2(t)x2(t)|G
2
t
)
E
(
m2(t)|G
2
t
) + E
(
m2(t)n2(t)|G
2
t
)
E
(
m2(t)|G
2
t
) ,
(3)
where
(
(y, z1, z2), x1, x2
)
is a solution of the FBSDE

−dy(t) =

a(t)y(t) + b1(t)E
(
b1(t)x1(t)|G
1
t
)
E
(
m1(t)|G
1
t
) + b2(t)E
(
b2(t)x2(t)|G
2
t
)
E
(
m2(t)|G
2
t
) + 2∑
j=1
fj(t)zj(t)
+b1(t)
E
(
m1(t)n1(t)|G
1
t
)
E
(
m1(t)|G 1t
) + b2(t)E
(
m2(t)n2(t)|G
2
t
)
E
(
m2(t)|G 2t
) + c(t)
]
dt
−z1(t)dw1(t)− z2(t)dw2(t), (4a)
dx1(t) =
[
a(t)x1(t)− l1(t)(y(t)− k1(t))
]
dt+ f1(t)x1(t)dw1(t) + f2(t)x1(t)dw2(t), (4b)
dx2(t) =
[
a(t)x2(t)− l2(t)(y(t)− k1(t))
]
dt+ f1(t)x2(t)dw1(t) + f2(t)x2(t)dw2(t), (4c)
y(T ) = ξ, x1(0) = −r1(y(0) − h1), x2(0) = −r2(y(0) − h2). (4d)
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Note that since (4a) contains the conditional expectation of xi(t) with respect to G
i
t (i = 1, 2),
(4) is new in both FBSDE and filter theories. Due to the complexity of G it (i = 1, 2), we are
uncertain whether (4) admits a unique solution except for some special cases.
3 Three special cases
This section focuses on solving Problem (AI) with Markovian setting, i.e., all coefficients in (1)
and (2) are deterministic. For the information structures (i)-(iii), we obtain the feedback Nash
equilibrium points by the Riccati equations and filters of BSDEs.
3.1 Special symmetric information: G 1t = G
2
t = F
w2
t
With this symmetric information structure, we derive an explicit form of the feedback Nash
equilibrium point of Problem (AI), which provides an important result for solving the asymmetric
information cases in Section 3.2. Note that this result is not discussed in literature, say, [13].
That is why we study this case again.
Introduce two ordinary differential equations (ODEs, for short)

α˙1 − b
2
1m
−1
1 α
2
1 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1α2 + l1 = 0, (5a)
β˙1 − (a+ b
2
1m
−1
1 α1 + f
2
2 )β1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1β2 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α1 − l1k1 = 0, (5b)
α1(0) = −r1, β1(0) = r1h1 (5c)
and 

α˙2 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α
2
2 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α2 − b
2
1m
−1
1 α1α2 + l2 = 0, (6a)
β˙2 − (a+ b
2
2m
−1
2 α2 + f
2
2 )β2 − b
2
1m
−1
1 α2β1 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α2 − l2k2 = 0, (6b)
α2(0) = −r2, β2(0) = r2h2, (6c)
which will be derived step by step in Theorem 3.1. Here we omit the time variable t in (5a),
(5b), (6a) and (6b) for simplicity. Similar convention will be taken for the subsequent ODEs,
SDEs, BSDEs and FBSDEs except for the initial or terminal conditions.
Throughout Section 3, we always assume that
(A1). b21(t)m
−1
1 (t) = b
2
2(t)m
−1
2 (t) and f1(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ].
The assumption provides a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of solutions
to (5) and (6).
Lemma 3.1 Under (A1), there exists a unique solution (α1, β1, α2, β2) to (5) and (6).
Proof. Let α = α1 + α2. It follows from (A1) that
α˙− b21m
−1
1 α
2 − (2a+ f22 )α+ l1 + l2 = 0 on (0, T ], α(0) = −(r1 + r2). (7)
Since (7) is a standard Riccati equation, it has a unique solution α(·). Introduce two auxiliary
equations
˙¯α1 +
[
(2a+ f22 )− b
2
1m
−1
1 α
]
α¯1 + l1 = 0 on (0, T ], ˙¯α1(0) = −r1, (8)
˙¯α2 +
[
(2a+ f22 )− b
2
2m
−1
2 α
]
α¯2 + l2 = 0 on (0, T ], ˙¯α2(0) = −r2, (9)
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where α is the solution to (7). Obviously, (8) and (9) have unique solutions α¯1 and α¯2, respec-
tively. In addition, we can check that α1 and α2 in (5a) and (6a) are also the solutions to (8)
and (9), respectively. From the uniqueness of solution of (8) with (9), it follows that
α¯1 = α1, α¯2 = α2,
which implies in turn that (5a) and (6a) have the unique solutions α1 and α2, respectively.
Let β = β1 + β2 and β(0) = r1h1 + r2h2. We have
β˙ − (a+ b21m
−1
1 α+ f
2
2 )β − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α − l1k1 − l2k2 = 0 on (0, T ], (10)
where α is the solution to (7). Note that (10) has a unique solution β. Introduce
˙¯β1 − (a+ f
2
2 )β¯1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1β − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α1 − l1k1 = 0 on (0, T ] (11)
with β¯1(0) = r1h1 and
˙¯β2 − (a+ f
2
2 )β¯2 − b
2
1m
−1
1 α2β − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α2 − l2k2 = 0 on (0, T ] (12)
with β¯2(0) = r2h2, where α1, α2 and β are the solutions to (8), (9) and (10), respectively.
Similarly, we can prove that (5b) and (6b) also have unique solutions β1 and β2 satisfying
β¯1 = β1, β¯2 = β2.
Based on the arguments above, we can derive the unique analytical expressions for α1, α2, β1,
β2, α and β. Then the proof is completed. 
Theorem 3.1 Under (A1), Problem (AI) has a unique Nash equilibrium point{
u1(t) = m
−1
1 (t)b1(t) (α1(t)y˜(t) + β1(t)) + n1(t),
u2(t) = m
−1
2 (t)b2(t) (α2(t)y˜(t) + β2(t)) + n2(t),
(13)
where h˜(t) = E
(
h(t)
∣∣Fw2t ), αi, βi (i = 1, 2) and y˜ satisfy (5), (6) and (31), respectively.
Proof: (i) We first prove that the Nash equilibrium point (u1, u2) is uniquely determined by{
u1(t) = m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)x˜1(t) + n1(t),
u2(t) = m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)x˜2(t) + n2(t),
(14)
where
(
(y, z1, z2), x1, x2
)
is the solution of the FBSDE

−dy =
(
ay + b21m
−1
1 x˜1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 x˜2 + f2z2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
dt−
2∑
j=1
zjdwj , (15a)
dx1 = [ax1 − l1(y − k1)] dt+ f2x1dw2, (15b)
dx2 = [ax2 − l2(y − k2)] dt+ f2x2dw2, (15c)
y(T ) = ξ, x1(0) = −r1(y(0)− h1), x2(0) = −r2(y(0)− h2). (15d)
According to (A1) and Proposition 2.1, it is enough to prove the existence and uniqueness of
(15). The detail of the proof is divided into three steps.
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Step 1: Filtering equations.
Note that (15a) depends on the filter x˜i. Then we need to compute the filter
(
y˜, z˜2, x˜1, x˜2
)
of
(
y, z2, x1, x2
)
with respect to Fw2t . Applying Lemma 5.4 in [14] to (15), we get

−dy˜ =
(
ay˜ + b21m
−1
1 x˜1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 x˜2 + f2z˜2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
dt− z˜2dw2, (16a)
dx˜1 = [ax˜1 − l1(y˜ − k1)] dt+ f2x˜1dw2, (16b)
dx˜2 = [ax˜2 − l2(y˜ − k2)] dt+ f2x˜2dw2, (16c)
y˜(T ) = E
(
ξ|Fw2T
)
, x˜1(0) = −r1(y˜(0) − h1), x˜2(0) = −r2(y˜(0) − h2). (16d)
Recall (4a). If f1(t) 6= 0, the generator of (16a) has an additional term f1z˜1, which leads to a
difficulty of proving the existence and uniqueness of solution to (16a).
Step 2: Existence and uniqueness of (16).
Introduce an FBSDE

−dp =
(
ap+ b21m
−1
1 n+ f2q + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
dt− qdw2,
dn =
[
an− (l1 + l2)p+ l1k1 + l2k2
]
dt+ f2ndw2,
p(T ) = E
(
ξ|Fw2T
)
, n(0) = −(r1 + r2)p(0) + r1h1 + r2h2.
(17)
If
(
(y˜, z˜2), x˜1, x˜2
)
is a solution to (16), then (n, p, q) is a solution to (17), where we set
p = y˜, q = z˜2, n = x˜1 + x˜2.
On the other hand, let (p, q, n) be a solution to (17). Introduce an SDE

dN1 = [aN1 − l1(p− k1)] dt+ f2N1dw2,
dN2 = [aN2 − l2(p− k2)] dt+ f2N2dw2, (18)
N1(0) = −r1(p(0) − h1), N2(0) = −r2(p(0) − h2),
which has a unique solution (N1, N2) with N1 + N2 = n. Furthermore, we can check that(
(p, q), N1, N2
)
is a solution to (16). It implies that the existence and uniqueness of (16) is
equivalent to that of (17). It is easy to check that (17) has a unique solution (p, q, n) (see, e.g.,
Theorem 2.3 in [17]). So does (16).
Step 3: Existence and uniqueness of (15).
Let
(
(y˜, z˜2), x˜1, x˜2
)
be the unique solution to (16). For the fixed x˜1 and x˜2, we can prove
that (15) has a unique solution by some arguments similar to Step 2.
(ii) To get the feedback Nash equilibrium point, we have to establish the relationship between
y˜ and x˜i (i = 1, 2). Noticing the terminal condition of (15), we set
xi = αiy + βi (19)
with αi(0) = −ri and βi(0) = rihi, i = 1, 2. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to x1 in (19) subject to (15a),
we obtain
dx1 =
[
(α˙1 − aα1)y − b
2
1m
−1
1 α1x˜1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1x˜2 − f2α1z2 + β˙1 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α1
]
dt
+
2∑
j=1
α1zjdwj . (20)
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Substituting (19) into (15b) and comparing the coefficients between (15b) and (20), we have
z1 = 0, z2 = f2α
−1
1 x1 ≡ f2y + f2α
−1
1 β1, (21)
[
α˙1 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α1 + l1
]
y − b21m
−1
1 α1x˜1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1x˜2 + β˙1 −
(
a+ f22
)
β1
− (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α1 − l1k1 = 0. (22)
Taking E [·|Fw2t ] on both sides of (19), (21) and (22), it yields
x˜i = αiy˜ + βi, i = 1, 2, (23)
z˜1 = 0, z˜2 = f2α
−1
1 x˜1 ≡ f2y˜ + f2α
−1
1 β1 (24)
and
[
α˙1 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α1 + l1
]
y˜ − b21m
−1
1 α1x˜1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α1x˜2 + β˙1 −
(
a+ f22
)
β1
− (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α1 − l1k1 = 0. (25)
Plugging (23) into (25), we derive (5). Similarly, we have
z1 = 0, z2 = f2α
−1
2 x2 ≡ f2y + f2α
−1
2 β2, (26)
[
α˙2 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α2 + l2
]
y − b21m
−1
1 α2x˜1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α2x˜2 + β˙2 −
(
a+ f22
)
β2
− (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α2 − l2k2 = 0. (27)
Taking E [·|Fw2t ] on both sides of (26) and (27), it yields
z˜1 = 0, z˜2 = f2α
−1
2 x˜2 ≡ f2y˜ + f2α
−1
2 β2 (28)
and
[
α˙2 − (2a+ f
2
2 )α2 + l2
]
y˜ − b21m
−1
1 α2x˜1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α2x˜2 + β˙2 −
(
a+ f22
)
β2
− (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)α2 − l2k2 = 0, (29)
subject to (23). Plugging (23) into (29), we derive (6).
According to (23), (16a) is rewritten as{
−dy˜ =
[(
a+ b21m
−1
1 α
)
y˜ + f2z˜2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 β + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
]
dt− z˜2dw2,
y˜(T ) =E
(
ξ|Fw2T
)
.
(30)
Solving it, we get a unique solution
y˜(t) = E
[
ΓTt E
(
ξ|Fw2T
)
+
∫ T
t
Γst
(
b21m
−1
1 β + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
(s)ds
∣∣∣Fw2t
]
, (31)
where
Γst = exp
{∫ s
t
(
a+ b21m
−1
1 α−
1
2
f22
)
(r)dr +
∫ s
t
f2(r)dw2(r)
}
,
and α = α1 + α2 and β = β1 + β2 are uniquely given by (5) and (6), respectively. 
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3.2 Special asymmetric information
3.2.1 G 1t = Ft and G
2
t = F
w2
t .
In this case, E
(
x1(t)|G
1
t
)
= E (x1(t)|Ft) = x1(t) and E
(
x2(t)|G
2
t
)
= E (x2(t)|F
w2
t ) = x˜2(t).
With the notations, we get
Theorem 3.2 Under (A1), Problem (AI) has a unique Nash equilibrium point denoted by{
u1(t) =m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)
(
γ1(t)y(t) + γ2(t)y˜(t) + γ3(t)
)
+ n1(t),
u2(t) =m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)
(
α2(t)y˜(t) + β2(t)
)
+ n2(t).
(32)
Here y˜ and y are given by (31) and (41), respectively; (α2, β2) and (γ1, γ2, γ3) are the solutions
to (6) and (40), respectively.
Note that even through the player 1 has access to the complete information, the information
available to the player 2 has an effect on the control policy of the player 1 via y˜(t). This is an
interesting phenomenon indeed.
Proof. We complete this proof by two steps.
Step 1: We prove that under (A1), the Nash equilibrium point is uniquely determined by{
u1(t) = m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)x1(t) + n1(t),
u2(t) = m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)x˜2(t) + n2(t),
(33)
where
(
(y, z1, z2), x1, x2
)
is the solution of the FBSDE

−dy =
(
ay + b21m
−1
1 x1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 x˜2 + f2z2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
dt−
2∑
j=1
zjdwj , (34a)
dx1 = [ax1 − l1(y − k1)] dt+ f2x1dw2, (34b)
dx2 = [ax2 − l2(y − k2)] dt+ f2x2dw2, (34c)
y(T ) = ξ, x1(0) = −r1(y(0)− h1), x2(0) = −r2(y(0)− h2). (34d)
Similar to Theorem 3.1, we only need to prove the existence and uniqueness of (34). It is easy
to see that the optimal filter
(
y˜, z˜2, x˜1, x˜2
)
of
(
y, z2, x1, x2
)
in (34) still satisfies (16). Thus, y˜ is
given by (31), and x˜2 is uniquely represented by y˜ as shown in (23). Then (34a) with (34b) is
rewritten as

−dy =
(
ay + f2z2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 x1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 α2y˜ + b
2
2m
−1
2 β2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
)
dt
−
2∑
j=1
zjdwj , (35a)
dx1 = [ax1 − l1(y − k1)] dt+ f2x1dw2, (35b)
y(T ) = ξ, x1(0) = −r1(y(0) − h1). (35c)
Thanks to Theorem 2.3 in [17], (35) has a unique solution
(
y, z1, z2, x1
)
. Substituting y in (35)
into (34c) and (34d), (34c) has a unique solution x2. Therefore, (34) is uniquely solvable.
Step 2: We verify that the feedback Nash equilibrium point is shown as (32). According to
(35a) and (35b) together with the initial condition in (35c), we set
x1 = γ1y + γ2y˜ + γ3 (36)
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with γ1(0) = −r1, γ2(0) = 0, γ3(0) = r1h1. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to x1 in (36), we have
dx1 =
{
(γ˙1 − aγ1) y +
(
γ˙2 − (a+ b
2
1m
−1
1 α)γ2
)
y˜ − b21m
−1
1 γ1x1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 γ1x˜2 − γ1f2z2
− γ2f2z˜2 + γ˙3 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c)γ1 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
1m
−1
1 β)γ2
}
dt
+ γ1z1dw1 + (γ1z2 + γ2z˜2) dw2 (37)
with x˜2 = α2y˜ + β2 and z˜2 = f2y˜ + f2α
−1
2 β2. Comparing (35b) with (37), we get
z1 = 0, z2 = f2y + f2γ
−1
1 γ3 − f2γ
−1
1 γ2α
−1
2 β2, (38)
[
γ˙2 −
(
a+ b21m
−1
1 α+ f
2
2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ1
)
γ2 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α2γ1
]
y˜ +
[
γ˙1 − (a+ f
2
2 )γ1 − b
2
1m
−1
1 γ
2
1
]
y
+ γ˙3 −
(
f22 + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ1
)
γ3 −
(
b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
2m
−1
2 β2
)
γ1 −
(
b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
1m
−1
1 β
)
γ2
= (aγ1 − l1)y + aγ2y˜ + aγ3 + l1k1. (39)
Then we have

γ˙1 − b
2
1m
−1
1 γ
2
1 − (2a+ f
2
2 )γ1 + l1 = 0, (40a)
γ˙2 − (2a+ b
2
1m
−1
1 α+ f
2
2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ1)γ2 − b
2
2m
−1
2 α2γ1 = 0, (40b)
γ˙3 − (a+ f
2
2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ1)γ3 − l1k1 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
2m
−1
2 β2)γ1
−(b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
1m
−1
1 β)γ2 = 0, (40c)
γ1(0) = −r1, γ2(0) = 0, γ3(0) = r1h1, (40d)
which has a unique solution (γ1, γ2, γ3). Substituting (36) into (35a), we derive
y(t) = E
(
ξΥTt +
∫ T
t
Υstg2(s)ds|Ft
)
(41)
with
Υst = exp
{∫ s
t
(
g1(r)−
1
2
f22 (r)
)
dr +
∫ s
t
f2(r)dw2(r)
}
,
g1 = a+ b
2
1m
−1
1 γ1,
g2 = (b
2
1m
−1
1 γ2 + b
2
2m
−1
2 α2)y˜ + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ3 + b
2
2m
−1
2 β2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c.
Then the proof is completed. 
Remark 3.1 The above arguments can also be used to solve the case of G 1t = Ft and G
2
t = F
w1
t .
We omit it here.
3.2.2 G 1t = F
w1
t and G
2
t = F
w2
t .
We assume that
(A2). f2(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ].
With the assumption, the filter of
(
y, z1, z2, x1, x2
)
in (4) with respect to Fw1t is existent
and unique. Then we derive the following feedback Nash equilibrium point.
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Theorem 3.3 Under (A1) and (A2), the feedback Nash equilibrium point of Problem (AI) is
uniquely denoted by{
u1(t) = m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)
(
γ1(t)yˆ(t) + γ2(t)Ey(t) + γ3(t)
)
+ n1(t),
u2(t) = m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)
(
τ1(t)y˜(t) + τ2(t)Ey(t) + τ3(t)
)
+ n2(t).
(42)
Here Ey, yˆ and y˜ are given below in (49), (51) and (54), respectively; γi and τi (i = 1, 2, 3) are
uniquely determined by (40) and (53) with f2 replaced by 0, respectively.
Proof: Firstly, we prove under (A1) and (A2), Problem (AI) has a unique Nash equilibrium
point determined by {
u1(t) = m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)xˆ1(t) + n1(t),
u2(t) = m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)x˜2(t) + n2(t),
(43)
where
(
(y, z1, z2), x1, x2
)
is the solution of the FBSDE

−dy =
[
ay + b21m
−1
1 xˆ1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 x˜2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
]
dt−
2∑
j=1
zjdwj , (44a)
dx1 =
[
ax1 − l1(y − k1)
]
dt, (44b)
dx2 =
[
ax2 − l2(y − k2)
]
dt, (44c)
y(T ) = ξ, x1(0) = −r1(y(0)− h1), x2(0) = −r2(y(0) − h2). (44d)
Once again, it is enough to prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (44). By
the method similar to that of Theorem 3.1, the optimal filters yˆ and xˆ1 of y and x1 in (44a) and
(44b) with respect to Fw1t are governed by

−dyˆ =
[
ayˆ + b21m
−1
1 xˆ1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 Ex2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
]
dt− zˆ1dw1, (45a)
dxˆ1 =
[
axˆ1 − l1(yˆ − k1)
]
dt, (45b)
yˆ(T ) = E
(
ξ|Fw1T
)
, xˆ1(0) = −r1(yˆ(0) − h1). (45c)
Here Eη stands for the expectation E
(
η(t)
)
of η(t). Similarly, we obtain the optimal filters y˜
and x˜2 of y and x2, in (44a) and (44c), with respect to F
w2
t as follows:

−dy˜ =
[
ay˜ + b21m
−1
1 Ex1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 x˜2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c
]
dt− z˜2dw2, (46a)
dx˜2 =
[
ax˜2 − l2(y˜ − k2)
]
dt, (46b)
y˜(T ) = E
(
ξ|Fw2T
)
, x˜2(0) = −r2(y˜(0) − h2). (46c)
On the other hand, Ex1 and Ex2 together with Ey satisfy an ordinary differential equation

−E˙y = aEy + b21m
−1
1 Ex1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 Ex2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c, (47a)
E˙x1 = aEx1 − l1Ey + l1k1, (47b)
E˙x2 = aEx2 − l2Ey + l2k2, (47c)
Ey(T ) = Eξ, Ex1(0) = −r1(Ey(0)− h1), Ex2(0) = −r2(Ey(0)− h2), (47d)
where E˙η denotes dE(η(t))
dt
for η = y, x1, x2. Using the method shown in Step 2 of Theorem
3.1 again, we conclude that (47) has a unique solution (Ey,Ex1, Ex2) under (A1) and (A2)
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(see the diffusion degenerate case of Theorem 2.3 in Yu and Ji [17]). Plugging Ex2 and Ex1
into (45) and (46), we conclude that (45) and (46) have the unique solutions
(
(yˆ, zˆ1), xˆ1
)
and(
(y˜, z˜2), x˜2
)
, respectively. For the fixed xˆ1 and x˜2, (44) is decoupled, then it has a unique solution
(y, z1, z2, x1, x2).
Subsequently, we verify that (42) is the feedback Nash equilibrium point. Since the required
calculuses are similar to those of Sections 3.1 and 3.2.1, we omit unnecessary technical details,
but present key steps for the convenience of the reader.
The relationship between Exi and Ey is
Exi = αiEy + βi (i = 1, 2), (48)
where αi, βi, α and β are the unique solutions to (5)-(7) and (10) with fi(·) = 0 (i = 1, 2), and
Ey(t) = Γ¯Tt Eξ +
∫ T
t
Γ¯st
[(
b21(s)m
−1
1 (s)β(s) + b1n1 + b2n2 + c(s)
)]
ds (49)
with
Γ¯st = exp
{∫ s
t
[
a(r) + b21(r)m
−1
1 (r)α(r)
]
dr
}
.
The filter xˆ1 is written as
xˆ1 = γ1yˆ + γ2Ey + γ3, (50)
where γi (i = 1, 2, 3) is the solution to (40) with fi(·) = 0 (i = 1, 2), and
yˆ(t) = ΞTt E (ξ|F
w1
t ) +
∫ T
t
Ξstg3(s)ds (51)
with
Ξts = exp
{∫ s
t
[
a(r) + b21(r)m
−1
1 (r)γ1(r)
]
dr
}
and
g3 =
(
b22m
−1
2 α2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 γ2
)
Ey + b21m
−1
1 γ3 + b
2
2m
−1
2 β2 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c.
Also, x˜2 is written as
x˜2 = τ1y˜ + τ2Ey + τ3, (52)
where (τ1, τ2, τ3) is the unique solution to

τ˙1 − b
2
2m
−1
2 τ
2
1 − 2aτ1 + l2 = 0, (53a)
τ˙2 −
(
2a+ b21m
−1
1 α+ b
2
2m
−1
2 τ1
)
τ2 − b
2
1m
−1
1 α1τ1 = 0, (53b)
τ˙3 − (a+ b
2
2m
−1
2 τ1)τ3 − (b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
1m
−1
1 β1)τ1
−(b1n1 + b2n2 + c+ b
2
1m
−1
1 β)τ2 − l2k2 = 0, (53c)
τ1(0) = −r2, τ2(0) = 0, τ3(0) = r2h2. (53d)
Then we derive
y˜(t) = ΨTt E (ξ|F
w2
t ) +
∫ T
t
Ψstg4(s)ds (54)
with
Ψst = exp
{∫ s
t
[
a(r) + b22(r)m
−1
2 (r)τ1(r)
]
dr
}
and
g4 =
(
b22m
−1
2 τ2 + b
2
1m
−1
1 α1
)
Ey + b21m
−1
1 β1 + b
2
2m
−1
2 τ3 + b1n1 + b2n2 + c.
Thus, (42) is the feedback Nash equilibrium point. Then the proof is completed. 
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3.3 Numerical example
This section is devoted to illustrating the above results by a numerical example. Without loss
of generality, we let a = 1, b1 = 1, b2 = 2, f1 = 0, f2 = 1, l1 = 2, l2 = 4,m1 = 1,m2 = 4, n1 =
n2 = k1 = k2 = c = 0, r1 = 2, r2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 0 in Section 3.2.1. Solving (6), (31), (40) and
(41), we get 

α2(t) =
24e5t − 20e4t + 1
1− 6e5t
,
β2(t) = 0,
y˜(t) = exp
{
3
2
(T − t) + ln
6e5t − 1
6e5T − 1
}
× E
(
ξew2(T )−w2(t)|Fw2t
)
,
γ1(t) =
2e−3t + 4
e−3t − 4
,
γ2(t) = 1 +
54e5t − 40te4t − 803 e
7t − 2456 e
4t − 32
24e8t − 6e5t − 4e3t + 1
,
γ3(t) = 0,
y(t) = E
[
ξΥTt +
∫ T
t
Υst (γ2(s) + α2(s)) y˜(s)ds|Ft
]
with Υst = exp
{
1
2(s− t) + ln
4e3t−1
4e3s−1
+ w2(s)− w2(t)
}
. Then Theorem 3.2 implies that the feed-
back Nash equilibrium point is uniquely denoted by

u1(t) = γ1(t)y(t) + γ2(t)y˜(t),
u2(t) =
1
2
α2(t)y˜(t).
Similarly, we can also perform numerical computations of the Nash equilibrium points in Theo-
rems 3.1 and 3.3. We omit them for simplicity.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper studies an LQ non-zero sum differential game problem, where the information avail-
able to the players is asymmetric, and the game system is a BSDE rather than an SDE. Using the
filters of FBSDEs and the existence and uniqueness of FBSDEs, we obtain the feedback Nash
equilibrium points of the game problem with observable information generated by Brownian
motions. Also, we prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium points.
Three observable filtrations (see the information structures (i)-(iii) in Section 2.2) are de-
scribed to classify the information available to the two players. Although the observable infor-
mation of the player 2 is same in these three cases, the control policy of the player 2 varies
according to the control policy of the player 1. This interesting phenomenon reflects the game
behavior of these two players very nicely. The results in Section 3 are based on f1(t) = f2(t) = 0.
If f1(t)f2(t) 6= 0, it is difficult to prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
point. We shall come back to this case in a future work.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we use a few novel examples to illustrate the reasonability and significance of
studying the special cases in Section 3.
Example A.1. Consider a controlled BSDE

−dyv1,v2(t) = g
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v21 (t), z
v1,v2
2 (t),
v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
− zv1,v21 (t)dw1(t)− z
v1,v2
2 (t)dw2(t),
yv1,v2(T ) = x(T )
(55)
with {
dx(t) = b
(
t, x(t)
)
dt+ δ1(t)dw1(t) + δ2(t)dw2(t),
x(0) = 0.
Here δ1 and δ2 are uniformly bounded and deterministic; b and g are deterministic and satisfy
certain conditions which guarantee the existence and uniqueness of solution to (55); and v1
and v2 are control processes for the player 1 and the player 2, respectively. Note that x is not
controlled, and yv1,v2 is coupled with x at the terminal time T . Cost functional for the player i
(i = 1, 2) is of the form
Ji
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
li
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v21 (t), z
v1,v2
2 (t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt+ ri
(
yv1,v2(0)
)}
, (56)
where li and ri are deterministic, and satisfy certain integrability conditions. Assume that
the player 1 has access to the complete information Ft, i.e., the player 1 selects his/her con-
trol process v1 according to Ft. However, the player 2 can only partially observe the state
(x, yv1,v2 , zv1,v21 , z
v1,v2
2 ) through a noisy process{
dW2(t) = h
(
t, x(t)
)
dt+ dw2(t),
W2(0) = 0,
(57)
where h is deterministic and uniformly bounded. Define the admissible control sets
X1 = {v1(·); v1(t) is Ft-adapted and square-integrable}
and
X2 =
{
v2(·); v2(t) is F
W2
t -adapted and square-integrable
}
.
Then the game problem is stated as follows.
Problem (A.1). Find a pair of admissible controls (u1, u2) such that

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v1(·)∈X1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v2(·)∈X2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
subject to (55), (56) and (57).
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In the sequel, we wish to simplify Problem (A.1) by an equivalent transformation. Set
ρ1(t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
h(s, x(s))dw2(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
|h(s, x(s))|2ds
}
and
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
FT
= ρ1(T ).
Since h is bounded, Girsanov theorem implies that Q is a new probability measure, and thus
(w1,W2) is a standard Brownian motion under Q. Plugging (57) into (55), we have

−dyv1,v2(t) =
[
g
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v21 (t), z
v1,v2
2 (t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
+ h(t, x(t))zv1 ,v22 (t)
]
dt
− zv1,v21 (t)dw1(t)− z
v1,v2
2 (t)dW2(t),
yv1,v2(T ) = x(T )
(58)
with {
dx(t) =
[
b
(
t, x(t)
)
− δ2(t)h(t, x(t))
]
dt+ δ1(t)dw1(t) + δ2(t)dW2(t),
x(0) = 0.
On the other hand,
ρ−11 (t) = exp
{∫ t
0
h(s, x(s))dW2(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
|h(s, x(s))|2ds
}
.
Then (56) is rewritten as
J˘i
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
=
1
2
EQ
{∫ T
0
ρ−11 (t)li
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v21 (t), z
v1 ,v2
2 (t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
+ri
(
yv1,v2(0)
)}
. (59)
We can check that Ft = F
w1,W2
t . So X1 is equivalent to the admissible control set
Y1 =
{
v1(·); v1(t) is an F
w1,W2
t -adapted and square-integrable process
}
.
Now Problem (A.1) can be equivalently stated as follows.
Problem (A.1’). Find a pair of admissible controls (u1, u2) such that

J˘1(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v1(·)∈Y1
J˘1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J˘2(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v2(·)∈X2
J˘2(u1(·), v2(·)),
subject to (58)-(59).
Remark A.1 Assume that two players partially observe the state (x, yv1,v2 , zv1,v21 , z
v1,v2
2 )
and get the same observable information W2 in Example A.1. Similarly, we can formulate a
non-zero sum game of BSDE, and equivalently transform it into one with the same Brownian
motion observation, which is corresponding to the information structure (i) in Section 2.2. The
details of the deduction are omitted for simplicity.
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Remark A.2 Recall the admissible control sets Y1 and X2. Problem (A.1’) is a non-zero
sum stochastic differential game of non-Markovian BSDE with asymmetric Brownian motion
observation, which is corresponding to the information structure (ii) in Section 2.2.
Example A.2. Let the state and the cost functional be same as (55) and (56), respectively.
Suppose that (x, yv1,v21 , z
v1,v2
1 , z
v1,v2
2 ) is only partially observed by the player i (i = 1, 2) through

dWi(t) = h¯i
(
t, x(t)
)
dt+
2∑
j=1
σijdwj(t),
Wi(0) = 0,
(60)
respectively. Here h¯i is uniformly bounded, and σ =
(
σ11 σ12
σ21 σ22
)
is an invertible constant
matrix. Admissible control set for the player i is defined by
Vi =
{
vi(·); vi(t) is F
Wi
t -adapted and square integrable
}
.
Then the game problem is
Problem (A.2). Find a pair of admissible controls (u1, u2) such that

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v1(·)∈V1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v2(·)∈V2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
subject to (55), (56) and (60).
To simplify Problem (A.2), we set
h¯(t, x(t)) =
(
h¯1
(
t, x(t)
)
h¯2
(
t, x(t)
)) , W (t) = (W1(t)
W2(t)
)
,
σ¯ = σ−1 =
(
σ¯11 σ¯12
σ¯21 σ¯22
)
,
c¯(t, x(t)) =
(
c¯1
(
t, x(t)
)
c¯2
(
t, x(t)
)) = σ¯h¯(t, x(t)),
w¯(t) = w(t) +
∫ t
0
c¯(s, x(s))ds,
ρ2(t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
c¯ ∗(s, x(s))dw(s) −
1
2
∫ t
0
|c¯(s, x(s))|2ds
}
.
Let dP¯
dP
∣∣∣
FT
= ρ2(T ). Similarly, P¯ is a new probability measure, and consequently, w¯ is a standard
Brownian motion under P¯. Then
dW (t) = σdw¯(t), dw(t) = σ¯dW (t)− c¯(t, x(t))dt.
We also set
X = x, Y v1,v2 = yv1,v2 , Zv1,v21 = σ¯11z
v1,v2
1 + σ¯21z
v1,v2
2 ,
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Z
v1,v2
2 = σ¯12z
v1,v2
1 + σ¯22z
v1,v2
2 . With the notations above, (55) is equivalently rewritten as

−dY v1,v2(t) = g¯
(
t,X(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v21 (t), Z
v1,v2
2 (t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
− Zv1,v21 (t)dW1(t)− Z
v1,v2
2 (t)dW2(t),
Y v1,v2(T ) = X(T )
(61)
with 

dX(t) =
(
b
(
t,X(t)
)
− δ1(t)c¯1
(
t,X(t)
)
− δ2(t)c¯2
(
t,X(t)
))
dt
+ (σ¯11δ1(t) + σ¯21δ2(t)) dW1(t) + (σ¯12δ1(t) + σ¯22δ2(t)) dW2(t),
X(0) = 0,
where
g¯ = g
(
t, Y v1,v2(t),
σ¯22Z
v1,v2
1 (t)− σ¯21Z
v1,v2
2 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
,
σ¯11Z
v1,v2
2 (t)− σ¯12Z
v1,v2
1 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
, v1(t), v2(t)
)
+ c¯1(t,X(t))
σ¯22Z
v1,v2
1 (t)− σ¯21Z
v1,v2
2 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
+ c¯2(t,X(t))
σ¯11Z
v1,v2
2 (t)− σ¯12Z
v1,v2
1 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
.
Furthermore, we assume that σ is orthogonal in order to guarantee that W is also a standard
Brownian motion under P¯, under which (61) is a non-Markov BSDE. On the other hand, (56)
is rewritten as
J¯i
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
=
1
2
EP¯
{∫ T
0
l¯i
(
t,X(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v21 (t), Z
v1,v2
2 (t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
+ri
(
Y v1,v2(0)
)}
, (62)
where EP¯ denotes the expectation under P¯,
l¯i = ρ
−1
2 (t)li
(
t, Y v1,v2(t),
σ¯22Z
v1,v2
1 (t)− σ¯21Z
v1,v2
2 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
,
σ¯11Z
v1,v2
2 (t)− σ¯12Z
v1,v2
1 (t)
σ¯11σ¯22 − σ¯12σ¯21
, v1, v2
)
and
ρ−12 (t) = exp
{∫ t
0
c¯ ∗(s,X(s))σ¯dW (s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
|c¯ ∗(s,X(s))|2ds
}
.
Now Problem (A.2) is equivalently stated as follows.
Problem (A.2’). Find a pair of admissible controls (u1, u2) such that

J¯1(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v1(·)∈V1
J¯1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J¯2(u1(·), u2(·)) = min
v2(·)∈V2
J¯2(u1(·), v2(·)),
subject to (61)-(62).
Remark A.3 This is also a non-zero sum stochastic differential game of non-Markovian
BSDE with mutually independent Brownian motion observation, which is corresponding to the
information structure (iii) in Section 2.2.
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